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I. INTRODUCTION
Stem cell research has been a point of controversy for years. On the one hand,
it is associated for many with the hope of finding ways to treat previously
incurable diseases; on the other hand, it is cause for rejection, concern, and
anxiety, especially where it is perceived as overstepping the line. Stem cells
are currently in high demand as objects of research because of their specific
nature as “original cells”, that is, possessing the ability to reproduce almost
limitlessly and having the capability to become many different types of cells.
Stem cells are to be found in the human organism at all stages of its develop-
ment, and yet opinions diverge concerning their various suitability for research
purposes.
There are six different harvesting techniques which entail particular methods
of research, each raising a different set of ethical issues since not all types of
harvesting imply the destruction of human embryos: 1) research on stem cells
from umbilical cord blood; 2) research on adult stem cells; 3) research on
stem cells from aborted embryos; 4) research on embryonic stem cells from
surplus embryos after in-vitro fertilization (IVF) treatments; 5) Research on
embryonic stem cells from embryos created especially for this purpose using
IVF (“consumptive embryo research”); and 6) research on stem cell lines
imported from abroad.
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Stem cell research is globally controversial. Debates are raging on this
topic from North America to Europe, from Asia Minor to China and Japan
(Kennedy Institute, 2004).
Although legal opinion concerning stem cell research’s permissibility varies
considerably from country to country and the obstacles facing researchers are
as different as they possibly could be, it has become apparent that the new
options opened up by stem cell research are perceived worldwide as a new
way of dealing with human life (Meilaender, 2001; Meyer & Nelson, 2001).
Philosophical and religious traditions are being consulted to ascertain whether
this new stance can be justified or not. The reactions in East and West are
manifold. Some brought up in the Western tradition have a major problem
with this changing view of human existence, away from the subject of life and
towards the object of research. This is exacerbated by the realization that arti-
ficial fertilization, or extracorporeal access to life-in-the-making, has led to
the fundamental problems now underlying modern reproductive medicine and
stem cell research, a situation which can no longer be reversed. Prenatal diag-
nostics (PND) continues to pose difficult issues to the present day (Krones &
Richter, 2004).
Stem cell research is nationally controversial. Like many other biomedical
topics, stem cell research divides society. But the issue it raises of “consumptive
embryo research”, that is, of whether life may be destroyed for the purposes of
research, even divides individual groups: politicians, philosophers, scientists,
theologians, patients, and families. Stem cell research touches the very core of
our attitudes towards life and thus has a deeply symbolic significance.
This is an explanation for the hefty contradiction in Germany voiced by
Hubert Markl (2001), the president of the famous Max Planck Society for the
Advancement of Science, to a widely respected speech by German President
Johannes Rau (2001), appealing that life not be objectified and the line not
overstepped (for a more detailed analysis of this conflict, see Schmidt, 2003).
Two years later, a statement delivered by the German Minister of Justice,
Brigitte Zypries (2003), to the effect that an artificially fertilized egg cell, or
an embryo in vitro, could not be perceived from a legal point of view as
possessing human dignity, almost amounted to the breaking of a taboo.
Although it was not new for the philosophical debate, the public outrage this
statement provoked showed just how sensitive the issue of protecting human
life-in-the-making is in Germany. If this sensitivity is hard to comprehend in
other countries, then this only goes to prove just how differently these debates
are pursued across the world. 
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II. EUROPE AS THE MOTHER OF MODERNITY
The stem cell debate in Europe is telling for many reasons. First, Europe can
be seen as the “mother of modernity” (Sloterdijk, 2002, p. 27). Controversies and
developments arising in North America, for example, are basically “European
offshoots”: the philosophical roots of such conflicts are often to be found in
European traditions. Second, Europe is permeated by a search for peaceable
solutions to conflicts and the moving experience of what it means to live
together in tolerance. Centuries of (bellicose) conflict, culminating in the First
and Second World Wars, are in the last 60 years being overcome through eco-
nomic collaboration (European Union), attempts at joint regulation of bioethical
issues in the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (Council of Europe,
1997), and the passing of a common Constitution. However, none of these
attempts is capable of masking the difficulties involved in finding and pro-
nouncing a common European basis. On the contrary, arguments about the
Convention, which have been raging for years, and the fact that even today
some countries have yet to sign the Convention, elucidate the point that many
agreements have only been possible in Europe through the conscious inclu-
sion of linguistic ambiguities, in order to achieve a sufficiently large scope for
interpretation (Delkeskamp, 2000). 
Even attempts to define European identity by means of the common root of
Christianity have ultimately failed, due to the fact that various governments
within Europe could not agree to the inclusion of a reference to the Christian
roots of the European continent in a joint Constitution. Even where this failure
has been welcomed (Llosa, 2004), the view that these roots and traditions play
an important role in bioethical decision-making is still largely respected. This
is because religious traditions are far too formative to be ignored, despite the
fact that the individual European countries differ considerably in the amount
of influence the churches have, for example. Issues concerning the beginning
and the end of life, from consumptive embryo research to euthanasia, raise
key human questions which always involve one or more religious aspects.
In his speech at the awards ceremony for the Peace Prize by the German
book trade, the philosopher Jürgen Habermas touched upon the issue of
whether such questions can be addressed at all without regress to religious
language. The notion of God and that of man being His creature in the Judeo-
Christian tradition imply “an intuition which […] may even speak to those
who are tone-deaf to religious connotations” (Habermas, 2003, p. 114). This
must not be rejected out of hand as a philosophical reconstruction of Christian
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ideas; far more, it expresses an European understanding of the world that
human life rests on foundations it does not owe to itself (Wabel, 2004).
III. THE BOUNDARIES OF COMMON GROUND
The drawing up of the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, with
all its difficulties and ultimate outcome, has rendered many sceptical about a
common European solution to bioethical issues (Schmidt, 2000). Too often
compromises were sought, clarity avoided, and the individual countries left to
decide how to implement the various stipulations at home. Stem cell research
poses an additional problem in this context, however. What happens when a
member state rejects stem cell research and prohibits it domestically, but the
EU passes a common research project to be financed jointly by all member
states, including those who have rejected it for their own countries? (Beck-
mann, 2004). 
This number of The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy lays out the
geography of the debate on stem cell research in Europe and shows why the
disagreement between states and within states cannot be solved on the basis
of a common solution due to what Hauskeller calls, in relation to Great Britain,
“a complex set of previous political regulations which can only be under-
stood by referring to the particular dominant style of ethical reasoning and
political self-understanding” of that specific country (Hauskeller, 2004).
This collection of essays also illustrates the attempts of individual European
countries to regulate dealings with stem cell research and records the pro-
cesses involved in the decisions taken. It reveals the extent to which country-
specific arguments play a role within Europe and repeatedly encounters the
issue of which role the state should play at all in the authorization or prohibition
of research.
The first essay by Christine Hauskeller provides a detailed account of the
presuppositions that define the British context, one of the most liberal in
Europe as far as regulations on embryo research are concerned. The British
situation is uniquely characterized by the high value given to certain indivi-
dualistic principles (autonomy and choice). These principles are then trans-
lated in the socio-political discourse into efforts to support financially and
scientifically the field of embryonic stem cells, with an eye to achieving
leadership in the field and consequently to exercise influence on the ethical
guidelines that could regulate research at the international level (Hauskeller,
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2004). Hauskeller, however, is eager to point out that this project is doomed
to fail since, in European standards (EU), there is not agreement as to the
ontological and moral status of the embryo and the principles or concepts
(i.e., respect, dignity, right to life, sanctity, etc.) that should guide bioethical
reflections.
Howard J. Curzer, although examining the issue of stem cell research from
the context of the United States, illustrates the complexity of the debate. His
essay shows that the issue at stake is not about the right to use stem cells or
the question of what would be the ethical way to use them, but about the kind
of arguments that will determine why it is justified (or not justified, by the
same token) harvesting embryonic stem cells and to show why these argu-
ments succeed or fail. In his analysis, the ambiguity resides in the use of the
language of embryos having the right to life.
The controversy over the status of the human embryo is the main focus of
the third essay by Alexandre Mauron and Bernard Baertschi, who look at
the debate on stem cell research in Switzerland. The main focus of their essay
is a critique of a middle position concerning the status of the embryo called
the respect model. This position assigns to the embryo “some form of intrin-
sic value that commands respect without preventing all forms of killing of
early embryos” (Mauron & Baertschi, 2004). This means that the notions of
respect and human dignity play a crucial role in the debate, and find their
roots in the Kantian sense of dignity. This, the authors argue, by way of over-
simplifications and misunderstandings, leads to the problematic notion of
embryological Kantianism which is present in many official pronouncements
and ethics commissions statements.
The problem of embryological Kantianism, according to Mauron and
Baertschi, is that its core definitional value, that is, respect, is ambiguous at
three levels: 1) What is the basis for respect? 2) What are the prohibitions
imposed by respect? and 3) How much respect is owed to an early embryo
and how to balance respect with the interests of patients? Although the notion
of embryological Kantianism is reflected in many moral traditions in Europe,
it needs, Mauron and Baertschi argue, to be critically examined in order to
further the discussion of stem cell research because the arguments sustaining
such a position do not support a “quasi-personal status of the embryo.”
The essay by Giovanni Maio further demonstrates how the language of
respect or dignity of the embryo is rather subject to many interpretations and
is not free from ambiguities, as the French context shows. In 1994 the French
parliament passed three bioethics laws, one of which guarantees the dignity of
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the embryo except when parents grant permission to use embryos for medical
purposes. As a general rule “artificial creation of embryo in vitro for research
is prohibited” in France (Article L. 152-8 of the bioethics law of 1994). On
the other hand, the status of the embryo is not clearly defined, although the
language of respect for every human being from the beginning of his/her life
is recognized (Maio, 2004). The ambiguity of the French position is even
further demonstrated in how the National Ethics Commission, in 2000,
revised the 1994 bioethics laws and encouraged a liberalization of research on
supernumerary embryos (while rejecting the creation of embryos for research)
due to potential therapeutic applications. The main premise for the liberalization
of research was based on the concept of “virtual solidarity,” which confers a
higher moral status to the patients who might benefit from embryonic
research than the embryos themselves. Maio’s article shows that the notions
of respect and dignity appeal to certain human intuitions present in the moral
tradition of many European countries but do not allow for determining the
ontological and moral status of the embryo. 
The next two articles, by Jan Beckmann and by Tanja Krone and Gerd
Richter, look at the discussion on stem cell research within the German
context. One of the particularities of the German context is that, contrary to
the British context, it has very strict laws regulating research on human
embryos, while at the same time, under the Stem Cell Act of 2002, allowing
under very specific conditions (high priority: enlargement of medical knowl-
edge and gaining scientific knowledge for the sake of human beings; absence
of alternative; Beckmann, 2004), the use of human embryonic stem cells
for research.
Beckmann points out that the German Parliament debated the question of
embryonic stem cell research in relation to three fundamental principles: 1)
how to protect human dignity and 2) the right to life, and 3) how to secure
freedom of research. Beckmann discusses the interplay of these three funda-
mental principles and argued that the debate ended up creating two main posi-
tions in Germany: the first maintains that human embryos are human beings
and deserve full protection, while the other holds that a human embryo, before
implantation, might only become a person and therefore a ranking of value
and priorities may be established, allowing research under certain conditions.
To avoid the impasse of the two conflicting positions, Beckmann argues for a
modified first position in which early human embryos are considered to be
human beings but are also subject to assessment. This position provides, in
his view, an alternative to the two main positions. It separates “the right to
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protection of life” from the notion of human dignity only insofar as high-pri-
ority research goals are established and consequently allows the use of super-
numerary embryos for research. 
The article by Krone and Richter examines the issues related to Preimplan-
tation Genetic Diagnosis and addresses the interesting and crucially relevant
set of issues PGD raises for the status of the embryo. In a study Krones and
Richter conducted on reproductive behavior, they conclude that a plurality of
views on the status of the embryo characterizes the public opinion, which is
caused by “the difference in backgrounds, situations and attitudes and not by
higher or lower levels of morality” (Krones & Richter, 2004). Consequently,
and contrary to most opinions, they argues that the status of the embryo cannot
be a “categorical norm” because there are other factors in ethical reflections
that are crucial in the decision making process (parents and their relation
towards their embryos should play a crucial role). 
IV. THE FUNDAMENTAL STANDPOINTS
This collection of essays suggests that despite some variations (see, for
instance, Beckmann (2004)) there are two main conflicting views about the
moral and ontological status of the human embryo. Contrasting the two funda-
mental standpoints in the stem cell debate reveals two different views of human
life and the protection of life (Schmidt, 2003).
Protection of life from the start
Human life is comprehended as inviolable from the start, from the moment of
fusion between sperm and egg cell. It cannot become part of a calculation
involving other values, goods or goals. Although this stance is a very old one,
throughout the course of history the exact moment when human life is thought
to start has increasingly been brought forward. One of the greatest influences
in the Middle Ages in this respect was Aquinas, who propounded the Aristotelian
notion that a human being only started to exist when God breathed a soul into
it. The male embryo was said to receive its soul on the 40th post-fertilization
day, the female embryo on the 80th. It was impossible for a human being to
evolve purely “biologically”, that is, without God’s help. Later, medical
research and especially the discovery of the female egg cell led to a rethinking
regarding the moment when human life is said to begin, for modern embryology
had revealed that nearly all the biological necessities for human development
506 KURT. W. SCHMIDT ET AL.
already exist at the point of conception. The Catholic Church duly took up this
discovery, and in 1869 Pope Pius IX decreed a “simultaneous giving of souls”
to replace the prior “consecutive giving of souls”: the soul is given to the
embryo not a few weeks into its development but parallel to conception; from
this point on the embryo is a developing human being deserving full protection.
Increasing levels of protection
Whereas the advocates of Position 1 consider a fertilized egg cell worthy of
full protection, from the moment of conception perceiving a human being
which merely has to mature (a developing human being), the advocates of
Position 2 assume that the fertilized egg cell first has to become a human
being (a human being in the making) and that the level of protection due to it
gradually increases as it does so.
The ethical debate has seen different stages of embryonic development
being put forward as meriting an increased level of embryo protection, that is,
the point where responsible research has to stop. Some see nidation, that is,
the implanting of the fertilized egg cell in the womb, as the point after which
interventions for research purposes can no longer be justified if ultimately
leading to the death of the embryo. These people argue that nidation marks the
start of the bond to the mother that is the prerequisite for development into
a human being capable of survival. This position is not only held by some phil-
osophers and biologists, but also is found in some religions, for example Islam. 
Others have argued for the point of increased protection being set when
twins are no longer a possibility and individuation has thus definitely begun;
for still others the deciding criterion is the formation of neuronal structures
and thus the presumed emergence of sensibility. Each of these cut-off points
stems from a particular view of humanity, and yet they all share the basic
assumption, often coupled with references to personal existence, that the protec-
tion due to human life increases in stages. Precisely because this development is
a continual process, they believe it necessary to divide it up into stages in
order to determine the moral status of each phase. 
V. CONCLUSION
These two competing positions cannot ultimately be united. As with other
conflicts, such as the debate about brain death, here too the bane of modern
ethics rears its ugly head. Just as the brain-dead can be perceived by so called
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“globalists” as living beings without brain functions or by the “analytical par-
ticularists” as dead beings with a functioning organism, two fundamentally
different and incommensurable views emerge in the debate surrounding stem
cell research. 
Whereas advocates of Group 1 (protection of life from the start) could only
agree to stem cell research on cells from umbilical cord blood or adults, advo-
cates of the (extremely heterogenous) Group 2 (protection of life in stages)
can go further and have no fundamental objections to research on surplus
embryos from IVF treatments. The philosophical and theological debate in
Europe shows that the question of the status of the embryo is an unavoidable
element in the make-up of the problem of stem cell research, but not in pro-
viding a decisive solution to it (Anselm et al., 2004).
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